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Abstract 
The purpose of our paper is to examine the profitability and social desirability of both 
domestic and foreign mergers in a location-quantity competition model, where we allow 
for the possibility of hollowing-out of the target firm. We refer to hollowing-out as the 
situation where the target firm is shut down following a merger with a domestic or 
foreign acquirer. Our analysis shows that mergers have ambiguous effects on the 
profitability of merged firms and on social welfare. Hollowing-out occurs in very few 
instances in our framework. One such instance is the case of firms located side-by-side in 
the same cluster and only if it is very costly to transfer the more efficient technology of 
the acquirer to the domestic target firm. This happens regardless of the origin of the 
acquirer, domestic or foreign. We also show that there are instances when a cross-border 
merger with hollowing out is not profitable but it is socially desirable. 
JEL classification: D43, G34, L41, L13  
Bank classification: Economic models; International topics; Market structure and 
pricing  
Résumé 
À l’aide d’un modèle de concurrence spatiale fondée sur les quantités, les auteures 
examinent la rentabilité de fusions menées par des entreprises nationales ou étrangères et 
leurs retombées sur le bien-être social. Le modèle permet la fermeture de la firme acquise 
par l’acheteur national ou étranger. Les auteures montrent dans leur analyse les effets 
mitigés des fusions sur la rentabilité et le bien-être. La fermeture de l’entreprise ne 
survient que dans un petit nombre de cas à l’intérieur du modèle. L’un de ces cas 
concerne la situation d’établissements voisins géographiquement et il ne se réalise que si 
les coûts de transfert de technologies au profit de la firme résidente visée par la fusion 
sont prohibitifs pour l’acquéreur (peu importe sa nationalité). D’après les auteures, il 
arrive aussi qu’une fusion transfrontière accompagnée d’une fermeture soit non rentable 
mais socialement préférable. 
Classification JEL : D43, G34, L41, L13  
Classification de la Banque : Modèles économiques; Questions internationales; Structure 
de marché et fixation des prix 1 Introduction
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) account for an increasing proportion of all
mergers. According to UNCTAD reports, the value of cross-border M&As increased from
less than $100 billion in the late 1980s to $720 billion in 1999 (UNCTAD, 2000). The recent
increase in cross-border mergers has fuelled a lot of discussion about their perceived nega-
tive eﬀects on domestic economies. Opponents of cross-border mergers argue that following
a cross-border takeover, domestic economies are being hollowed out, that is, domestic tar-
get ﬁrms are either shut down or losing their head oﬃce functions. In this view, foreign
takeovers have invariably negative eﬀects on governance, head oﬃce location, employment,
capital spending, etc. However, as Grant and Bloom (2008) indicate, hollowing-out is not
an inevitable consequence of foreign takeovers. Hollowing-out is rather seen as one possible
outcome of post-acquisition decisions made by the new owners. Thus, hollowing-out, that
is, the negative eﬀects resulting from a takeover, is neither inevitable nor limited to foreign
takeovers. In fact, foreign takeovers often have positive eﬀects on the operations of the
acquired ﬁrm, while domestic takeovers may result in hollowing-out.
The purpose of our paper is to determine circumstances when mergers–domestic and/or
foreign–result in hollowing-out of the domestic target ﬁrm. We refer to hollowing-out as
the situation where the target ﬁrm is shut down following a merger with a domestic or
foreign acquirer. In what follows, we employ the terms merger, acquisition, and takeover
interchangeably.
To this end, we use a spatial Cournot competition (circular city) model in which ﬁrms, do-
mestic and foreign, choose their location on a circle and compete in quantities ` a la Cournot.1
Mergers, either domestic or foreign, may occur and may result in hollowing-out; that is, the
domestic target being shut down. The attractiveness of a location-quantity model is two-fold.
Firstly, Cournot competition results in overlapping geographic markets of competing ﬁrms
selling a homogeneous product. Secondly, a spatial model allows us to examine ﬁrms’ location
choices and the resulting agglomeration equilibria. In this framework, we determine ﬁrms’
equilibrium location and the implications of mergers, domestic and cross-border, on merging
1This type of model is well suited for describing the behaviour of ﬁrms in industries such as automobile or
oil where several brands of the same product are delivered by plants (Matsushima, 2001b). The model has
also good predictions in terms of pricing for the cement industry (McBride, 1983) and for a representative
sample of industries (Greenhut, Greenhut, and Li, 1980).
1and non-merging ﬁrms’ proﬁts and social welfare. In addition, we analyze the merged ﬁrm’s
decision to shut down the target ﬁrm following a merger–domestic or cross-border. We refer
to this event as hollowing-out.
The industrial organization (IO) literature on horizontal mergers in a spatial model ex-
amines implications of mergers on ﬁrm proﬁts (merging and non-merging ﬁrms) and social
welfare. The literature goes back to Stigler (1950) who shows that it is more proﬁtable to
be outside a merger than participate in it. The reason is that when a merger occurs, the
merged ﬁrm produces less than the combined output before merger. Thus, the industry
price increases and, as a consequence, non-merging ﬁrms increase their output. This strate-
gic output response by non-merging ﬁrms is large enough to make mergers unproﬁtable.
This also gives rise to a positive externality from mergers since merging ﬁrms cannot fully
capture the proﬁts that result from their merger. This is what Pepall, Richards, and Nor-
man (2002) refer to as the “merger paradox”–a merger does not guarantee larger proﬁts for
the merged ﬁrm compared with their combined pre-merger proﬁts. In fact, Salant, Switzer,
and Reynolds (1983) show that in an oligopolistic industry with homogeneous goods, linear
demand and constant marginal costs, a horizontal merger is never proﬁtable unless it in-
cludes more than 80% of the industry ﬁrms. Subsequent papers have shown, however, that
mergers are proﬁtable if Cournot competition is extended to allow for cost synergies (Farrell
and Shapiro, 1990), increasing marginal costs (Perry and Porter, 1985), and diﬀerentiated
products (Lommerud and Sorgard, 1997).
Despite their importance, cross-border mergers have received little attention in the IO
and international trade literature. The existing studies investigate the incentives for and
proﬁtability of cross-border mergers under diﬀerent scenarios. For example, Qiu and Zhou
(2006) show that information sharing about domestic demand increases the proﬁtability of
a merger between a domestic and a foreign ﬁrm. Bjorvatn (2004) looks at the eﬀect of
economic integration on the proﬁtability of cross-border mergers. In this context, economic
integration may increase pre-merger competition and the reservation price of the target ﬁrm.
This, in turn, increases the proﬁtability of a cross-border merger. Long and Vousden (1995)
examine the eﬀect of trade liberalization on the proﬁtability of cross-border mergers. They
ﬁnd that the eﬀect depends on whether trade liberalization is unilateral or bilateral and on
the magnitude of cost savings generated from mergers. Horn and Persson (2001) examine
the eﬀect of trade costs on mergers. Using a coalition formation approach they show that
2high trade costs may be conducive to national mergers, while low trade costs may favour
international mergers. Neary (2007) is another study of the impact of trade liberalization
on cross-border mergers. In a general equilibrium model he shows that bilateral mergers in
which low-cost ﬁrms buy out higher-cost foreign ﬁrms are proﬁtable. Trade liberalization, in
this context, can trigger international merger waves which serve as instruments of compar-
ative advantage. Nocke and Yeaple (2007) also use a general equilibrium model with ﬁrm
heterogeneity with respect to their capabilities. Firm capabilities diﬀer in their degree of
international mobility and ﬁrms participate in the merger market to exploit complementari-
ties between capabilities. Their results suggest that in industries where ﬁrms vary mainly in
their mobile capabilities, the most eﬃcient ﬁrms will engage in cross-border mergers, while
in industries where ﬁrms vary mainly in their country-speciﬁc non-mobile capabilities, the
least eﬃcient ﬁrms will engage in cross-border mergers.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it examines the proﬁtability
and social desirability of both domestic and foreign mergers in a spatial competition model.
Another important contribution is the possibility of hollowing-out following a merger. In this
framework, we determine ﬁrms’ equilibrium locations, the impact of mergers on ﬁrms’ proﬁts,
and the impact of mergers on social welfare. Matsushima (2001b) and Cosnita (2005) also
analyze the proﬁtability of mergers in a spatial competition model, but they do not examine
cross-border mergers, the incentive for hollowing out, or the welfare implications of mergers.
We consider two alternative scenarios for ﬁrms’ location choice. In one scenario, domestic
ﬁrms choose their location ﬁrst followed by foreign ﬁrms. We refer to this scenario as the
sequential location choice model. This set-up describes an industry where foreign ﬁrms face
barriers to entry. A removal of these barriers may induce ﬁrms to enter the domestic market
either by foreign direct investment (FDI) or by merging with a local ﬁrm. In the case of
FDI, the foreign ﬁrm may later decide to merge with a domestic ﬁrm. We examine this case
in Section 3.
In the alternative scenario, we assume domestic and foreign ﬁrms choose their location
simultaneously after which mergers may occur. We refer to this scenario as the simultaneous
location choice model. This model is well ﬁtted to describe an industry where domestic ﬁrms
compete with subsidiaries of foreign ﬁrms and cross-border mergers have been restricted. A
change in regulation may create incentives for cross-border mergers. We analyze this scenario
in Section 4.
3Our analysis shows that mergers have ambiguous eﬀects on the proﬁtability of merged
ﬁrms and on social welfare. On the one hand, mergers reduce competition–“competition
eﬀect”–and result in cost savings–“cost eﬀect.” On the other hand, non-merged ﬁrms respond
strategically by raising output–“strategic eﬀect.” The overall proﬁtability of a merger thus
depends on which eﬀects dominate, that is, the competition and cost eﬀects versus the
strategic eﬀect. The eﬀect of a merger on social welfare depends on whether or not the cost
savings and strategic eﬀects dominate the competition eﬀect. If the cost savings and strategic
eﬀects dominate, the merger increases social welfare and should be encouraged. If, on the
other hand, the competition eﬀect dominates, the merger reduces social welfare and should be
discouraged. Which eﬀects dominate depends critically on the location equilibrium and the
market size and concentration. Our numerical simulations identify cases when a merger can
be both proﬁtable and socially beneﬁcial, proﬁtable but socially detrimental, unproﬁtable
but socially beneﬁcial.
With regards to hollowing-out, this occurs in very few instances in our framework. One
such instance is the case of ﬁrms located side-by-side in the same cluster and only if it is
very costly to transfer the more eﬃcient technology of the acquirer to the domestic target
ﬁrm. This happens regardless of the origin of the acquirer, domestic or foreign. We can,
however, provide examples when a cross-border merger with hollowing out is not proﬁtable
but it increases social welfare.
2 The Basic Model
The model we employ is similar to those found in the circular city literature (see, for example,
Gupta (2004)). There are an inﬁnite number of consumers located uniformly on a circle with
perimeter equal to 1. There are n + 2 domestic ﬁrms and one foreign ﬁrm. We index ﬁrms
by i ∈ {0,1,2,F}. Firms are assumed to employ diﬀerent technologies with the foreign
ﬁrm employing the most eﬃcient one. n domestic ﬁrms have identical constant marginal
cost of production equal to c0 and the remaining two domestic ﬁrms have marginal costs c1
and c2. The foreign ﬁrm has constant marginal cost cF. In order to set ideas, we assume
cF < c1 < c2 < c0. The linear market demand at each point x on the circle is given by
p(x) = a − bQ(x), where a > 0 and b > 0 are constant, and Q(x) is the aggregate quantity
supplied at point x and p(x) is the market price at x. Denote by xi the location of ﬁrm
4i on the circle. Firms incur a transportation cost ti > 0 per unit of length. Thus, a ﬁrm
located at xi incurs a cost ti|x − xi| to ship a unit of the product from its own location to a
consumer located at point x on the circle, where |x − xi| is the distance between x and xi.
We assume that domestic ﬁrms have the same unit transportation cost; that is, ti = t, for
i = 0,1,2. The foreign ﬁrm, however, has a higher unit tranportation cost so that tF = t+ε,
ε > 0. This assumption captures the idea that domestic ﬁrms are typically more familiar
with the local market, such as consumer tastes, culture, advertising, distribution, regulation
etc. The assumed higher transportation cost could reﬂect, for example, higher advertising
costs paid out by the foreign ﬁrm (Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity, 2008).2 We
also assume, as is typical in circular city models, that all ﬁrms serve the entire market, thus
quantities are positive at each point on the circle.
We analyze two versions of the model. In one version, the foreign ﬁrm chooses its location
on the circle after the domestic ﬁrms have chosen their location. We refer to this version as
the sequential location choice model. In the second version, all ﬁrms choose their location
simultaneously. We refer to the second version as the simultaneous location choice model.
The sequence of events for the two versions is as follows.
Sequential Location Choice Model
Stage 0: Domestic ﬁrms incur set-up costs and choose their location on the circle.
Stage 1: The foreign ﬁrm enters the domestic market and chooses its location on the circle.
Stage 2: Mergers (domestic or cross-border) may take place.
Stage 3: Firms compete in quantities (Cournot competition).
Simultaneous Location Choice Model
Stage 1: All ﬁrms choose their location on the circle.
Stages 2 and 3 are the same as in the sequential location choice case.
There are two alternative assumptions regarding the technology transfer that we make in
each of the two models. One assumption is that following a merger, it is costless to transfer
technology of the low-cost ﬁrm to the high-cost ﬁrm. The alternative assumption is the polar
opposite one for which it is prohibitively costly to transfer the technology of the low-cost
ﬁrm to the high-cost ﬁrm. Therefore, under the latter assumption, following a merger the
2Others, such as Horn and Persson, (2001) also assume that foreign ﬁrms incur higher per unit transport
costs when serving a local market.
5target ﬁrm continues to use the high-cost production.
We determine the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the game by backward
induction.
2.1 Pre-merger Cournot Competition (Stage 4)
Before we solve for the equlibrium with mergers, we consider the pre-merger equlibrium. We
start at the last stage, with ﬁrms competing in quantities at each point in the market, taking
ﬁrm locations determined at the previous stages as given. At this stage, all ﬁrms (domestic
and foreign) have already chosen their location either simultaneously or sequentially. At
each point, x, on the circle, ﬁrm i chooses qi(x) to maximize proﬁts:
πi(x) = qi(x)[a − bQ(x) − ti|x − xi| − ci] (1)
for i = 0,1,2,F. We can easily obtain the equilibrium quantities, qi(x), by simultaneously
solving the ﬁrst-order conditions:
a − bQ(x) − ti|x − xi| − ci − bqi(x) = 0, (2)





a − (n + 3)(ti|x − xi| + ci) +
X
j6=i
(tj|x − xj| + cj)
i
, (3)
for i ∈ {0,1,2,F}. Note that the equilibrium quantities, qi(x), depend on the location chosen
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i
. (4)
Using the ﬁrst-order conditions, it can be easily shown that under Cournot competition
proﬁts at point x on the circle are proportional to the square of the quantity delivered to
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6where ki = a+
P
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is such that x∗
i maximizes (7) for i ∈ {0,1,2,F}. We consider the simultaneous and sequen-
tial location choice models in turn. In the simultaneous location choice case, all ﬁrms choose
their location simultaneously (stage 1). In the sequential location choice case, domestic ﬁrms
ﬁrst choose their location on the circle (stage 0) and then, the foreign ﬁrm chooses its loca-
tion taking the location of the domestic ﬁrms as given (stage 1). Before we turn to each of
these two cases, we introduce some preliminary notation and results.
In order to characterize the SPNE locations we follow Gupta et al (2004) and Gupta
(2004). For every point, x, on the circle we denote by ˆ x the point diametrically opposite.
Let L(x) denote the half circle from x to ˆ x (not including ˆ x) in the clockwise direction
and R(x) the half circle from x to ˆ x in the counter-clockwise direction. The following two
deﬁnitions in Gupta, Lai, Pal, Sarkar, and Yu (2004) are useful in characterizing the location
equilibrium.
7Deﬁnition 1 (Gupta, Lai, Pal, Sarkar, and Yu, 2004) x is a quantity median for ﬁrm i if
and only if the aggregate quantity supplied by ﬁrm i in L(x) equals the aggregate quantity






Deﬁnition 2 (Gupta, Lai, Pal, Sarkar, and Yu, 2004) x is a competitors’ aggregate cost
median for ﬁrm i if and only if the aggregate delivered marginal cost of all other ﬁrms in












tj|x − xj|dx|.3 (11)
It is straightforward to show that x is a ﬁrm’s quantity median if and only if it is also the
ﬁrm’s competitors’ aggregate cost median (Lemma 1 in Gupta et al, 2004). The following
result characterizes the SPNE locations.
Proposition 1 (Gupta, Lai, Pal, Sarkar, and Yu, 2004) Given the locations of its competi-
tors, ﬁrm i maximizes its proﬁts only if it locates at its competitors’ aggregate cost median
(or at its quantity median).
The intuition behind Propozition 1 is straightforward. The ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt
maximization requires that, at the equilibrium location, x, the change in proﬁts in L(x) must
equal the change in proﬁts in R(x). Since, under Cournot competition, proﬁts at each point
on the circle are proportional to the quantity delivered to that point, it also follows that the
change in proﬁts on each half circle is prortional to the quantity served on that half circle.
Thus, the quantities delivered on each half circle must be equal. It follows that the quantity
median property is satisﬁed. Since in a circular city model the quantity median property is
equivalent to the competitors’ aggregate cost median property, the latter is also satisﬁed in
equilibrium.
One important implication of the result above is that the location equilibrium is inde-
pendent of ﬁrms’ marginal costs of production. This is so because ﬁrms’ marginal cost of
production cancel out of the aggregate cost median condition, (11).










j6=i tj|x − xj|| +
P
j6=i cjdx. Cancelling out
P
j6=i cj, yields (11).
83 Sequential Location Choice
In this version of the model, domestic ﬁrms choose their location on the circle in the intitial
stage 0. Domestic ﬁrms’ locations are thus ﬁxed for all subsequent stages. In stage 1, the
foreign ﬁrm enters the domestic market and chooses its location on the circle. This decision
sequence of the sequential game is both a realistic one and allows for location equilibria for
domestic ﬁrms that are independent of the foreign ﬁrm’s transport cost diﬀerential.
We can again appeal to Proposition 1 to determine the location equilibria of the domestic
ﬁrms at stage 0. Given that the domestic ﬁrms have identical transport costs, there are
inﬁnitely many location equilibria, as shown in Gupta, Lai, Pal, Sarkar, and Yu (2004).
Without loss of generality and for an interesting comparison to the simultaneous choice
case, we focus on the SPNE in which ﬁrms agglomerate at the two ends of the diameter from
x = 0 to x = 1/2. This allows for a comparison of the one-cluster and two-cluster scenarios.
A possible two-cluster equilibrium is one where (n/2) type 0 ﬁrms and the type 1 ﬁrm locate
at x = 0, while the remaining ﬁrms locate at x = 1/2.4 The only location equilibrium for the
foreign ﬁrm that satisﬁes the competitors’ cost median condition stipulated in Proposition 1
is either x = 0 or x = 1/2. Without loss of generality we can assume that the foreign ﬁrm
locates at x = 0. In what follows, we index type 0 domestic ﬁrms by s = 0,1/2 to distinguish
between a type 0 ﬁrm located at x = 0 and a type 0 ﬁrm located at x = 1/2. Figure 1 below
illustrates this equilibrium.
3.1 Pre-merger Outcome
We begin by determining the equilibrium outcome after the foreign ﬁrm enters the domestic
market but before any merger takes place. All ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition, which
results in a Cournot output equilibrium similar to that outlined in sections 2.1 but with the
location selections outlined above. Thus, equilibrium quantities are given by (3), equilibrium
4Other combinations can also be supported as equilibria. For example, n1 type 0 ﬁrms and type i ﬁrm
located at x = 0, n2 type 0 ﬁrms and type j ﬁrm located at x = 1/2, with n1 + n2 = n, i,j = 1,2, i 6= j,
is also a possible equilibrium. The one-cluster equilibrium, with n1 type 0 ﬁrms and types 1 and 2 ﬁrms
located at x = 0 and n2 type 0 ﬁrms located at x = 1/2 is also a location equilibrium. We choose to focus
on the one above because it allows us to analyze cases of mergers that are diﬀerent from the ones identiﬁed
in the simultaneous location choice case. Furthermore, we do not lose any generality by assuming that
n1 = n2 = n/2, while somewhat simplifying the derivations.
90
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Figure 1: Two-cluster location equilibrium
10proﬁts are given by (7), and social welfare is given by (8). This pre-merger outcome serves as
the benchmark for comparison purposes when determining whether ﬁrms have an incentive
to merge and whether social welfare is harmed or enhanced by mergers.
3.2 Mergers
We now turn to stage 2 where mergers may occur. We examine in turn possible mergers,
their proﬁtability, and their implication for social welfare. Mergers have ambiguous eﬀects
on the joint proﬁts of merging ﬁrms (see, for example, Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983)).
The incentives to merge arise from the reduction in competition (the “competition eﬀect”)
amongst member ﬁrms and any cost reductions (the “cost eﬀect”) that result if merged ﬁrms
are all able to adopt the technology of the most eﬃcient ﬁrm. Taking competitors’ outputs
as given, the merged ﬁrm responds to merging by reducing its collective output since it
internalizes the negative impact of members’ decisions on what were once competitors. This
serves to raise market price. The remaining competing ﬁrms respond to this reduction in
output by raising their own output. This “strategic response” by competing ﬁrms can be
large enough to result in losses from mergers. Furthermore, the cost eﬀect of merger elicits
a strategic response of non-merger ﬁrms in reducing their collective output. These varying
eﬀects of merger have ambiguous results for proﬁts of all ﬁrms and for social welfare.
We consider two cases regarding technology transfer after a merger takes place. In one
case, we assume technology transfer is costless; that is, the merged ﬁrm adopts the more
eﬃcient technology at both plants. In the opposite case we assume technology transfer from
the low-cost to the high-cost ﬁrm is very costly, and, consequently, the target ﬁrm continues
to use the high-cost technology. We consider the following possible mergers: (i) domestic
merger of ﬁrms 1 and 2 located at opposite ends; (ii) cross-border merger of side-by-side
ﬁrms F and 1; (iii) cross-border merger of ﬁrms F and 2 located at opposite ends. Each of
these types of mergers may give rise to hollowing-out, and we therefore examine this outcome
as well.
3.3 Domestic Merger with Costless Technology Transfer
In this case the merging ﬁrms are domestic ﬁrms 1 and 2, which are located at x = 0
and x = 1/2, respectively. Since technology transfer is costless, the merged ﬁrm operates
11Table 1: Proﬁtability of Domestic Merger with Costless Technology Transfer, πD
M −(π1+π2)
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
10 -0.3686 -0.5695 -0.8113 -1.0949 -1.420
11 -0.5294 -0.7605 -1.0314 -1.3436 -1.6978
12 -0.7293 -0.9911 -1.2912 -1.6321 -2.0148
13 -0.9685 -1.2612 -1.5907 -1.9605 -2.3717
14 -1.2469 -1.5710 -1.9301 -2.3287 -2.7684
15 -1.5645 -1.9204 -2.3092 -2.7367 -3.2051
16 -1.9213 -2.3093 -2.7280 -3.1846 -3.6816
17 -2.3172 -2.7379 -3.1866 -3.6723 -4.1980
18 -2.7524 -3.2060 -3.6849 -4.1999 -4.7543
19 -3.2268 -3.7137 -4.2230 -4.7672 -5.3504
Table 2: Eﬀect of Domestic Merger with Costless Technology Transfer on Social Welfare,
SW D
M − SW
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
10 1.8254 3.6979 6.2054 9.3476 13.1245
11 2.9076 5.8609 9.8098 14.7536 20.6921
12 4.2332 8.5072 14.2172 21.3624 29.9425
13 5.8022 11.6365 19.4276 29.1742 40.8758
14 7.6147 15.2491 25.4410 38.1889 53.4920
15 9.6705 19.3448 32.2575 48.4065 67.7910
16 11.9697 23.9237 39.8770 59.8271 83.7729
17 14.5123 28.9858 48.2995 72.4506 101.4377
18 17.2983 34.5310 57.5251 86.2771 120.7853
19 20.3278 40.5593 67.5537 101.3064 141.8158
both plants because both can use the more eﬃcient production technology of ﬁrm 1 and the
ﬁrm can save on transport costs for delivery to consumers located closest to their respective
plants. The domestic merger of ﬁrms 1 and 2 is proﬁtable if the proﬁts of the merged ﬁrm
exceed the combined pre-merger proﬁts; that is, if ∆πD = πD
M −(π1+π2) > 0, and is welfare
improving if ∆SW = SW D
M − SW > 0. Details of proﬁts and social welfare are provided
in Appendix A. Given the complexity of the proﬁt and social welfare functions, we use
numerical simulations to gain insight into whether ﬁrms have an incentive to merge and
whether doing so improves social welfare. Tables 1 and 2 give the results of the numerical
simulation for the change in proﬁts and social welfare from pre- to post-merger.
12The simulations calculate proﬁt and welfare diﬀerentials for diﬀerent values of the demand
parameter a and the number of domestic ﬁrms n. We vary these two parameters because of
their importance to the magnitude of the ”competition eﬀect” of merger and the strategic
behaviour of competing ﬁrms. All other paramters are held constant at the values b = 1,
cF = 0, c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.3, c0 = 1, t = 1, and ε = 0.3. From the tables we can observe
that for the parameter values selected, domestic mergers decrease proﬁts of merging ﬁrms
but increase social welfare. The results in Table 1 show that, as a increases, proﬁts from
merger fall relative to those in the pre-merger case. The parameter a is a demand parameter
that enters proportionately into the competing ﬁrms’ reaction functions. The higher is a,
the greater is the marginal proﬁt to competing ﬁrms from raising their output in response to
merger. This strategic eﬀect can become dominant for high a. Thus, the proﬁt diﬀerential
becomes negative and the social welfare diﬀerential becomes more positive. Turning to the
eﬀect of the number of domestic ﬁrms n, note that the higher is n, the greater the number of
competing domestic ﬁrms. A higher n lowers the marginal beneﬁt from a strategic increase in
output for an individual ﬁrm, but the collective increase in output is higher. Thus, a higher
n can either increase or decrease the magnitude of the strategic response to merger. In this
case, the strategic response to merger serves to reduce merger proﬁts relative to pre-merger.
Social welfare rises with a greater number of competing ﬁrms.
3.3.1 Domestic Merger with Very Costly Technology Transfer
In this section, we assume that it is very costly to transfer the technology of the low-cost
ﬁrm 1 to the high-cost ﬁrm 2. In this case, the merged ﬁrm can either continue to operate
both plants to lower its transportation costs but incur higher production costs at plant 2,
or it can shut down plant 2 and incur higher transportation cost by delivering to all its
consumers from plant 1. The former option is that of no hollowing-out, while the latter
option is that of hollowing-out the less eﬃcient plant. We analyze the proﬁtability of each
type of domestic merger–with no hollowing-out (NH) and with hollowing-out (H)–in turn,
and then determine which case arises in equilibrium by comparing the proﬁts of the merged
ﬁrm under the two scenarios. In analyzing the hollowing-out case, we make the simplifying
assumption that hollowing out itself is costless. In reality, there are costs incurred with
shutting down a ﬁrm; including those associated with liquidating and disposing of physical
capital, the cancellation of contracts, etc. Including these costs in our model would have the
13implication of making hollowing out less proﬁtable. With our assumption of zero hollowing
out costs and in scenarios where hollowing out is indeed proﬁtable, we can then determine
the maximum level of costs such that hollowing out would become unproﬁtable.
3.3.2 Domestic Merger with No Hollowing-Out (NH)
In this case, the merged ﬁrm operates both plants. The merged ﬁrm will deliver to a location
x on the circle from plant 1 as long as proﬁts from delivering from plant 1 exceed those from
delivering from plant 2. The merged ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between delivering from either plant











The details of calculations are given in Appendix A. The merged ﬁrm will thus service
consumers located on (0,xD
NH) and (1 − xD
NH,1) from plant 1 and consumers located on
(xD
NH,1 − xD
NH) from plant 2.
A domestic merger with no hollowing-out is then proﬁtable if it yields higher proﬁts than
the two ﬁrms combined; that is, if πD
M,NH > π1 + π2. A simulation of the proﬁtability of
merger and its impact on social welfare is provided in the following tables. We see that for
the parameter values selected, such a merger is not proﬁtable and it decreases social welfare.
This implies that the “competition eﬀect” in combination with the strategic response of
competing non-merger ﬁrms are dominant eﬀects.
3.3.3 Domestic Merger with Hollowing-Out (H)
In the case of domestic merger of ﬁrms 1 and 2 with hollowing-out the high-cost plant 2 is
shut down and the merged ﬁrm delivers to consumers from plant 1. The domestic merger
with hollowing-out is proﬁtable if it results in higher proﬁts than the sum of pre-merger
proﬁts so that πD
M,H > π1 + π2.
In equilibrium a domestic merger with no hollowing-out occurs if the merger is proﬁtable
and gives higher proﬁts than the one with hollowing-out; that is, πD
M,NH > π1 + π2 and
πD
M,NH > πD
M,H must be both satisﬁed. The following tables provide the results of a simulation
of this case. Here we ﬁnd the interesting result that a domestic merger with hollowing-out
is not proﬁtable for merging ﬁrms but it is socially desirable. The strategic behaviour of
14Table 3: Proﬁtability of domestic merger with costly technology transfer and NH: πNH
D −
(π1 + π2)
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.3705 -0.5713 -0.8131 -1.0966 -1.4224
6 -0.5315 -0.7625 -1.0333 -1.3455 -1.6996
7 -0.7318 -0.9933 -1.2933 -1.6341 -2.0167
8 -0.9712 -1.2637 -1.5930 -1.9626 -2.3737
9 -1.2498 -1.5736 -1.9325 -2.3310 -2.7706
10 -1.5677 -1.9232 -2.3117 -2.7391 -3.2073
11 -1.9247 -2.3123 -2.7307 -3.1871 -3.6840
12 -2.3209 -2.7411 -3.1895 -3.6750 -4.2005
13 -2.7564 -3.2094 -3.6880 -4.2027 -4.7569
14 -3.2310 -3.7173 -4.2262 -4.7702 -5.3532
Table 4: Eﬀect of domestic merger with costly technology transfer with NH on social welfare:
SW NH
D − SW
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -1.8392 -3.7261 -6.2519 -9.4163 -13.2192
6 -2.9290 -5.9004 -9.8708 -14.8400 -20.8077
7 -4.2639 -8.5596 -14.2947 -21.4687 -30.0813
8 -5.8437 -11.7038 -19.5237 -29.3024 -41.0398
9 -7.6686 -15.3331 -25.5576 -38.3411 -53.6834
10 -9.7384 -19.4473 -32.3965 -48.5848 -68.0120
11 -12.0532 -24.0466 -40.0404 -60.0335 -84.0255
12 -14.6131 -29.1308 -48.4893 -72.6872 -101.7241
13 -17.4179 -34.7001 -57.7432 -86.5459 -121.1076
14 -20.4678 -40.7543 -67.8021 -101.6096 -142.1762
15Table 5: Proﬁtability of domestic merger with costly technology transfer and H: πH
D−(π1+π2)
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.3715 -0.5723 -0.8140 -1.0975 -1.4233
6 -0.5327 -0.7636 -1.0343 -1.3464 -1.7005
7 -0.7330 -0.9944 -1.2943 -1.6352 -2.0177
8 -0.9726 -1.2649 -1.5942 -1.9637 -2.3748
9 -1.2514 -1.5750 -1.9337 -2.3321 -2.7717
10 -1.5694 -1.9247 -2.3131 -2.7404 -3.2085
11 -1.9266 -2.3139 -2.7321 -3.1885 -3.6852
12 -2.3229 -2.7428 -3.1910 -3.6764 -4.2018
13 -2.7585 -3.2112 -3.6896 -4.2041 -4.7582
14 -3.2333 -3.7192 -4.2279 -4.7717 -5.3546
Table 6: Eﬀect of domestic merger with costly technology transfer and H on social welfare:
SW H
D − SW
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 1.8895 3.7753 6.3005 9.4646 13.2674
6 3.0028 5.9724 9.9419 14.9106 20.8780
7 4.3661 8.6594 14.3933 21.5666 30.1787
8 5.9794 11.8365 19.6547 29.4325 41.1693
9 7.8427 15.5036 25.7261 38.5085 53.8500
10 9.9560 19.6606 32.6075 48.7944 68.2207
11 12.3193 24.3077 40.2989 60.2904 84.2813
12 14.9326 29.4448 48.8003 72.9963 102.0320
13 17.7959 35.0719 58.1116 86.9123 121.4726
14 20.9092 41.1889 68.2330 102.0382 142.6033
competing ﬁrms is strong enough to make merger unproﬁtable (see Appendix B), and when
combined with the cost savings from having only the most eﬃcient ﬁrm produce, we have a
strong positive eﬀect of merger on social welfare.
3.4 Cross-border Merger with Costless Technology Transfer
We now consider a merger between the foreign ﬁrm and a domestic ﬁrm. Recall that the
foreign ﬁrm is assumed to have located itself at point 0 on the circle. Given all ﬁrms’
location choices at previous stages, we consider two possible types of cross-border merger.
One possibility is a merger between the foreign ﬁrm F and the type 1 domestic ﬁrm, both
16Table 7: Proﬁtability of a Type I Merger with Costless Technology Transfer, πI
M −(π1+πF)
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 0.0582 0.1307 0.2239 0.3379 0.4726
6 0.0322 0.1117 0.2119 0.3329 0.4746
7 -0.0138 0.0727 0.1799 0.3079 0.4566
8 -0.0798 0.0137 0.1279 0.2629 0.4186
9 -0.1658 -0.0653 0.0559 0.1979 0.3606
10 -0.2718 -0.1643 -0.0361 0.1129 0.2826
11 -0.3978 -0.2833 -0.1481 0.0079 0.1846
12 -0.5438 -0.4223 -0.2801 -0.1171 0.0666
13 -0.7098 -0.5813 -0.4321 -0.2621 -0.0714
14 -0.8958 -0.7603 -0.6041 -0.4271 -0.2294
located at x = 0. We refer to this case as the type I cross-border merger. Another possibility
is a merger between the foreign ﬁrm F and the type 2 domestic ﬁrm, located at opposite ends
of the diameter. We refer to the latter case as the type II cross-border merger. We examine
the proﬁtability of each type of merger in turn in order to determine whether either type
may arise in equilibrium. We also examine whether each type of merger is socially desirable.
3.4.1 Cross-border merger of ﬁrms F and 1 (Type I)
For this case, both parties to the merger are located side-by-side at x = 0. Given that
the domestic ﬁrm is able to costlessly adopt the foreign ﬁrm’s more eﬃcient production
technology, the merged ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between shutting down one plant (hollowing-out)
and keeping both plants open (no hollowing-out). In either case, the merged ﬁrm acts as
one ﬁrm. Quantities and proﬁts are therefore similar to those outlined in section 2.1, except
that now there are one fewer ﬁrms and marginal production cost for the merged ﬁrm is cF
and unit transport cost is t.
A type I cross-border merger is proﬁtable if the proﬁts of the merged ﬁrm are above
the combined proﬁts of the two ﬁrms prior to merging; that is, it is proﬁtable if ∆πI =
πI
M − (π1 + πF) > 0 and raises social welfare if ∆SW I = SW I
M − SW > 0. The details of
the proﬁt and social welfare calculations are provided Appendix A. Tables 7 and 8 give us
an example of the proﬁt and social welfare diﬀerentials between pre-and post-merger for a
selection of parameter values.
17Table 8: Eﬀect of a Type I Merger with Costless Technology Transfer on Social Welfare,
SW I
M − SW
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 0.6582 0.9609 1.2637 1.5664 1.8692
6 1.0542 1.5369 2.0197 2.5024 2.9852
7 1.5402 2.2429 2.9457 3.6484 4.3512
8 2.1162 3.0789 4.0417 5.0044 5.9672
9 2.7822 4.0449 5.3077 6.5704 7.8332
10 3.5382 5.1409 6.7437 8.3464 9.9492
11 4.3842 6.3669 8.3497 10.3324 12.3152
12 5.3202 7.7229 10.1257 12.5284 14.9312
13 6.3462 9.2089 12.0717 14.9344 17.7972
14 7.4622 10.8249 14.1877 17.5504 20.9132
As was true for a domestic merger, the results show that an increase in the demand
parameter a reduces the beneﬁt to member ﬁrms from merging because it increases the
strategic response of competiting ﬁrms to the merger (see Appendix B). This eﬀect serves to
lower the beneﬁts to ﬁrms from merging and to raise social welfare from mergers. We also
observe that, contrary to a domestic merger, cross-border mergers are more proﬁtable the
larger is the number of domestic ﬁrms, n. This arises because the larger is n the smaller is
the marginal beneﬁt to competing ﬁrms from strategically raising their output. At the same
time, the larger is n, the greater the collective output and thus the greater is social welfare.
3.4.2 Cross-border merger of ﬁrms F and 2 (Type II)
For this type of merger, the foreign ﬁrm located at x = 0 merges with the domestic ﬁrm of
type 2 located at the opposite end of the diameter at x = 1/2. With costless technology
transfer, the domestic ﬁrm adopts the more eﬃcient technology of the foreign ﬁrm and
produces at marginal cost cF. At the same time, the foreign ﬁrm adopts the lower transport
cost, t, of the domestic ﬁrm. Quantities, proﬁts, and social welfare are thus straightforward
adaptations of those laid-out in section 2.1.
An advantage of a type II merger compared to a type I merger is the savings in transport
costs for delivery to consumers located closest to each plant. Therefore, there is no incentive
for hollowing out of the domestic ﬁrm. It is straightforward to show that the merged ﬁrm
will deliver its product to consumers located on the (0,1/4) and (3/4,1) portions of the
18Table 9: Proﬁtability of Type II Merger with Costless Technology Transfer, πII
M −(π2 +πF)
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.7636 -1.2119 -1.7587 -2.4050 -3.1511
6 -1.0231 -1.5346 -2.1436 -2.8515 -3.6590
7 -1.3218 -1.8970 -2.5682 -3.3379 -4.2069
8 -1.6597 -2.2990 -3.0326 -3.8641 -4.7946
9 -2.0369 -2.7405 -3.5368 -4.4302 -5.4223
10 -2.4532 -3.2217 -4.0807 -5.0361 -6.0898
11 -2.9087 -3.7424 -4.6643 -5.6818 -6.7971
12 -3.4034 -4.3027 -5.2877 -6.3673 -7.5444
13 -3.9373 -4.9026 -5.9509 -7.0927 -8.3316
14 -4.5105 -5.5421 -6.6538 -7.8579 -9.1586
Table 10: Eﬀect of Type II Merger with Costless Technology Transfer on Social Welfare,
SW II
M − SW
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 1.8870 3.7519 6.2293 9.3174 13.0154
6 2.9998 5.9486 9.8705 14.7631 20.6259
7 4.3626 8.6353 14.3216 21.4189 29.9263
8 5.9754 11.8121 19.5827 29.2846 40.9168
9 7.8382 15.4788 25.6538 38.3603 53.5973
10 9.9510 19.6355 32.5349 48.6461 67.9677
11 12.3138 24.2822 40.2260 60.1418 84.0282
12 14.9266 29.4189 48.7271 72.8475 101.7786
13 17.7894 35.0456 58.0382 86.7632 121.2191
14 20.9022 41.1623 68.1593 101.8890 142.3496
circle from plant F and to consumers located on portion (1/4,3/4) from plant 2. A type
II merger is proﬁtable if the proﬁts of the merged ﬁrm are above the combined pre-merger
proﬁts of the two ﬁrms participating in the merger; that is, ∆II = πII
M − (π2 + πF) > 0, and
is socially beneﬁcial if ∆SW II = SW II
M − SW > 0. In equilibrium, a type I cross-border
merger arises if the merger is both proﬁtable and yields higher proﬁts than a type II merger;
that is, πI
M > π1+πF and πI
M > πII
M are satisﬁed. The details of the proﬁt and social welfare
equations are provided in Appendix A. Numerical simulations of the diﬀerentials between
pre- and post-merger proﬁts and social welfare are provided in Tables 9 and 10.
Note that for these parameter values, a type II merger is not proﬁtable but is socially
19desirable. This occurs because, for a type II merger, the strategic response of competing
ﬁrms to a merger is strong enough to dominate the beneﬁts from reducing competition and
from lowering costs (see Appendix B).
Comparing the proﬁtability of a type I merger with that of a type II given in Tables 7
and 9, we expect a type II merger would not occur. Given a choice between merging with
domestic ﬁrm 1 or 2, the foreign ﬁrm would choose to merge with ﬁrm 1 if technology transfer
is costless.
3.5 Cross-border Merger with Very Costly Technology Transfer
We now consider the situation where it is very costly to transfer technology from the low-
cost foreign ﬁrm to the high-cost domestic ﬁrm. We only consider this situation for a type
II merger because a type I merger with costly technology transfer would simply result in
closing down the type 1 plant and giving rise to hollowing-out, given that the two plants
are located side-by-side. For the type of merger considered here, the merged ﬁrm faces two
choices. It can either keep both plants open and save on transport costs but also incur
higher production costs at plant 2, or it can shut down the least eﬃcient plant 2 but have
more costly transportation. The former is the no hollowing-out case and the latter is the
hollowing-out case. We determine the proﬁtability of each case in turn to determine whether
either scenario can arise in equilibrium.
3.5.1 Cross-border Merger with no Hollowing-Out (NH)
In this case, the merged ﬁrm operates both plants–the lower cost plant F and the higher cost
plant 2. The beneﬁt to member ﬁrms from such a merger is the reduction in competition
and the reduction in transport costs when the foreign ﬁrm branch delivers the product using
the domestic ﬁrm unit transport cost advantage. The merged ﬁrm will deliver to a location
x on the circle from plant F as long as the proﬁts from delivering to that location exceed the
proﬁts from delivering from plant 2. The merged ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between delivering to x











20Table 11: Proﬁtability of Type II Merger with Costly Technology Transfer and No Hollowing-
out, πII
M,NH − (π2 + πF)
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.7646 -1.2129 -1.7597 -2.4060 -3.1520
6 -1.0243 -1.5358 -2.1447 -2.8526 -3.6601
7 -1.3232 -1.8982 -2.5694 -3.3390 -4.2080
8 -1.6612 -2.3003 -3.0339 -3.8653 -4.7958
9 -2.0385 -2.7420 -3.5381 -4.4315 -5.4235
10 -2.4550 -3.2232 -4.0821 -5.0374 -6.0911
11 -2.9106 -3.7441 -4.6659 -5.6832 -6.7985
12 -3.4055 -4.3045 -5.2894 -6.3688 -7.5458
13 -3.9395 -4.9045 -5.9526 -7.0943 -8.3330
14 -4.5128 -5.5442 -6.6556 -7.8596 -9.1601
Since c2 − cF > 0, xCB
M,NH > 1/4. The merged ﬁrm will thus service consumers located on
(0,xCB
M,NH) and (1 − xCB
M,NH,1) from plant F and consumers located on (xCB
M,NH,1 − xCB
M,NH)
from plant 2. The details for calculating ﬁrm proﬁts are provided in Appendix A. A type II
cross-border merger with no hollowing-out is proﬁtable if πCB
M,NH > π2 + πF. The results of
a simulation for this type II merger with no hollowing out are provided in Tables 11 and 12.
As we observe for the parameter values selected, merging is not proﬁtable but it does
increase social welfare. This is not surprising given the results obtained from the simulation
of a type II merger with costless technology transfer. By comparison, here there is no
production cost advantage to merging, and so the proﬁt diﬀerential is even more negative
than it is when technology transfer is costless. This also yields a smaller social welfare
diﬀerential.
3.5.2 Cross-border Merger with Hollowing-Out (H)
Here the merged ﬁrm shuts down the high-cost domestic plant 2 and services the entire
market from the low-cost foreign plant F. We thus have the full beneﬁt of production cost
savings. There is also a cost advantage to using the domestic ﬁrm’s lower transport cost,
but there is a cost disadvantage to delivering only from one plant. A type II cross-border
merger with hollowing-out is proﬁtable if πCB
M,H > π2 + πF. In equilibrium, a type II cross-
border merger with no hollowing-out occurs if the following two conditions are satisﬁed: (i)
21Table 12: Eﬀect of Type II Merger with Costly Technology Transfer and No Hollowing-out
on Social Welfare, SW II
M,NH − SW
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 1.8870 3.7519 6.2293 9.3174 13.0154
6 2.9998 5.9486 9.8705 14.7631 20.6259
7 4.3626 8.6353 14.3216 21.4189 29.9263
8 5.9754 11.8121 19.5827 29.2846 40.9168
9 7.8382 15.4788 25.6538 38.3603 53.5973
10 9.9510 19.6355 32.5349 48.6461 67.9677
11 12.3138 24.2822 40.2260 60.1418 84.0282
12 14.9266 29.4189 48.7271 72.8475 101.7786
13 17.7894 35.0456 58.0382 86.7632 121.2191
14 20.9022 41.1623 68.1593 101.8890 142.3496
πCB
M,NH > π2 + πF and (ii) πCB
M,NH > πCB
M,H. The results of a simulation of the hollowing out
case are provided in Tables 13 and 14.
We see that hollowing out is not proﬁtable, for all parameter values we considered. As
expected, the cost savings from hollowing out serve to increase the welfare diﬀerential from
merger.
4 Simultaneous Location Choice
In this version of the model, all ﬁrms, domestic and foreign, choose their location on the
unit circle simultaneously. In the case of identical transportation costs for all ﬁrms, Gupta,
Lai, Pal, Sarkar, and Yu (2004) show that there are inﬁnitely many location equilibria.
However, for non-identical transportation costs, Gupta (2004) shows that there exists only
an equilibrium where ﬁrms agglomerate at opposite ends of the same diameter. Since in our
framework it is assumed that the foreign ﬁrm has a higher unit transportation cost, we can
rule out all other location equilibria except the agglomeration equilibrium. There are two
such equilibria depending on the magnitude of the transport cost diﬀerential ε relative to t.
The location equilibrium is characterized by:
Proposition 2 (i) One-cluster equilibrium: All domestic ﬁrms located at x = 0 and the
foreign ﬁrm located at x = 1/2 can be supported as a SPNE if and only if t ≤ ε.
22Table 13: Proﬁtability of Type II Merger with Costly Technology Transfer and Hollowing-
out, πII
M,H − (π2 + πF)
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.2818 -0.4003 -0.5372 -0.6926 -0.8665
6 -0.3958 -0.5353 -0.6932 -0.8696 -1.0645
7 -0.5298 -0.6903 -0.8692 -1.0666 -1.2825
8 -0.6838 -0.8653 -1.0652 -1.2836 -1.5205
9 -0.8578 -1.0603 -1.2812 -1.5206 -1.7785
10 -1.0518 -1.2753 -1.5172 -1.7776 -2.0565
11 -1.2658 -1.5103 -1.7732 -2.0546 -2.3545
12 -1.4998 -1.7653 -2.0492 -2.3516 -2.6725
13 -1.7538 -2.0403 -2.3452 -2.6686 -3.0105
14 -2.0278 -2.3353 -2.6612 -3.0056 -3.3685
Table 14: Eﬀect of Type II Merger with Costly Technology Transfer and Hollowing-out on
Social Welfare, SW II
M,H − SW
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 0.9658 2.2326 3.9916 6.2429 8.9865
6 1.6118 3.8246 6.8896 10.8069 15.5765
7 2.4178 5.8166 10.5076 16.4909 23.7665
8 3.3838 8.2086 14.8456 23.2949 33.5565
9 4.5098 11.0006 19.9036 31.2189 44.9465
10 5.7958 14.1926 25.6816 40.2629 57.9365
11 7.2418 17.7846 32.1796 50.4269 72.5265
12 8.8478 21.7766 39.3976 61.7109 88.7165
13 10.6138 26.1686 47.3356 74.1149 106.5065
14 12.5398 30.9606 55.9936 87.6389 125.8965
23(ii) Two-cluster equilibrium: If n is even, n/2 type 0 domestic ﬁrms and the type 2 domestic
ﬁrm located at x = 0 and n/2 type 0 domestic ﬁrms, the type 1 domestic ﬁrm, and the
foreign ﬁrm located at x = 1/2 can be supported as a SPNE if and only if t ≥ ε.5
Proposition 2 is the generalization of Proposition 4 in Gupta (2004), which considers only
4 ﬁrms. In the one-cluster equilibrium, all domestic ﬁrms cluster at one end of the diameter
and the foreign ﬁrm, which is the ﬁrm with the highest transportation cost, locates by itself
at the other end of the diameter. This equilibrium arises if the transport cost diﬀerential is
large enough so that t ≤ ε. Thus, in this equilibrium, domestic ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts
by clustering away from the foreign ﬁrm because it has a substantial cost disadvantage in
delivering its product to consumers. This holds despite the fact that the foreign ﬁrm has
the most eﬃcient technology since it is only transportation costs that enter the location
equilibrium condition.
In the two-cluster equilibrium, ﬁrms locate at the two ends of the diameter as illustrated
in Figure 2. This equilibrium arises when the transport cost diﬀerential is not too large
so that t ≥ ε. The analysis for the two-cluster equilibrium is identical to the one in the
sequential location choice case examined in Section 3, which can also be interpreted as the
simultaneous location choice with two-clusters.
4.1 Domestic Mergers
Consider now the merger of domestic ﬁrms 1 and 2 in comparison to the pre-merger outcome
outlined in Section 2.1. First suppose that it is costless to transfer the technology of the
low-cost plant 1 to the high-cost plant 2. The merged ﬁrm therefore continues to operate
both plants. If, however, technology transfer is very costly, the domestic merger results in
hollowing-out as the merged ﬁrm shuts down the least eﬃcient plant 2. In either case, the
merged ﬁrm acts as one ﬁrm and produces at the lowest marginal cost, cM = c1. The merger
of ﬁrms 1 and 2 gives rise to an industry with n + 2 ﬁrms, n + 1 domestic and one foreign.
5Other two-cluster equilibria are also possible. For example, n1 type 0 domestic ﬁrms and the type i
domestic ﬁrm located at x = 0 and n2 type 0 domestic ﬁrms, the type j domestic ﬁrm, and foreign ﬁrm
located at x = 1/2, with n1 +n2 = n, and i,j = 1,2, i 6= j, can also be supported as a SPNE. Also, n1 type
0 domestic ﬁrms and type 1 and 2 domestic ﬁrms located at x = 0 and n2 type 0 domestic ﬁrms, and the
foreign ﬁrm located at x = 1/2 is also a location equilibrium. To ﬁx ideas, we choose to work with (ii).
240
Firms n x 0, 1, 2
1/2
Firm F
Figure 2: One-cluster location equilibrium
25Table 15: Proﬁtability of domestic merger: πD
M − (π1 + π2)
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 0.0823 0.0449 0.0256 0.0146 0.0077 0.0032 0.0001 -0.0022
5 0.0888 0.0298 0.0037 -0.0089 -0.0154 -0.0189 -0.0207 -0.0215
6 0.0603 -0.0165 -0.0442 -0.0541 -0.0567 -0.0562 -0.0544 -0.0522
7 -0.0032 -0.0938 -0.1182 -0.1209 -0.1160 -0.1088 -0.1013 -0.0940
8 -0.1017 -0.2022 -0.2184 -0.2094 -0.1935 -0.1768 -0.1611 -0.1472
9 -0.2352 -0.3418 -0.3446 -0.3196 -0.2892 -0.2600 -0.2341 -0.2115
10 -0.4037 -0.5125 -0.4968 -0.4515 -0.4030 -0.3586 -0.3201 -0.2872


























for i = 0,M,F, where kD
i = a+
P
j6=i,2 cj −(n+2)ci+(1/2)tF, gD
i = −(2t+tF) for i = 0,M,
and kD
F = a +
P
j6=F,2 cj − (n + 2)cF − (1/2)(n + 2)tF and gD
F = (n + 1)t + (n + 2)tF.
It is worth noting that ﬁrms have no incentives to change their location after the domestic
merger takes place. Thus, the pre-merger location equilibrium is also the only post-merger
location equilibrium.
The domestic merger of ﬁrms 1 and 2 is proﬁtable if it results in higher proﬁts than the
two ﬁrms combined prior to merging; that is, πD
M > π1 + π2. As was done in the sequential
model, we will perform simulations to gain insight into the proﬁtability of mergers and their
impact on social welfare. Table 15 gives the change in proﬁts as a result of merger for the
merging ﬁrms measured as the diﬀerence between the proﬁts of the merged ﬁrm and the
sum of pre-merger proﬁts for parameters b = 1, cF = 0, c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.9, c0 = 1, t = 0.3,
and ε = 0.7, and by the varying market size, a, and the number of ﬁrms in the industry,
n. As far as the demand size parameter, a, is concerned we restrict our attention to those
parameter values for which all ﬁrms deliver to all consumers on the circle; that is quantities
are positive at each location.
As Table 15 illustrates, the domestic merger of ﬁrms 1 and 2 is proﬁtable only if the
demand is not too high and the market is concentrated. It is interesting to also look at the
eﬀect of the domestic merger on the proﬁts of non-merging ﬁrms; i.e. type 0 domestic ﬁrms
and the foreign ﬁrm, F. Numerical simulations show that the proﬁts of non-merging ﬁrms
26Table 16: Social Welfare: Domestic vs Pre-merger, SW D − SW
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 0.0846 -0.1528 -0.7611 -2.1420 -4.8835 -9.7541 -17.7019 -29.8545
5 0.1086 -0.1356 -0.7489 -2.1334 -4.8774 -9.7499 -17.6991 -29.8527
6 0.1101 -0.1305 -0.7440 -2.1296 -4.8747 -9.7481 -17.6980 -29.8522
7 0.0891 -0.1377 -0.7465 -2.1305 -4.8752 -9.7486 -17.6987 -29.8531
8 0.0456 -0.1571 -0.7564 -2.1363 -4.8790 -9.7514 -17.7011 -29.8553
9 -0.0204 -0.1887 -0.7737 -2.1468 -4.8861 -9.7566 -17.7052 -29.8587
10 -0.1089 -0.2325 -0.7983 -2.1621 -4.8964 -9.7642 -17.7111 -29.8635
always increase following the domestic merger, as shown in Tables 23 and 24 in Appendix
B. Interestingly, such a domestic merger is socially beneﬁcial for a very narrow range of
parameter values. Table 16 shows the change in social welfare after a domestic merger takes
place relative to the pre-merger case.
Social welfare increases relative to the pre-merger case if n = 1 and a ∈ [4,8]. Thus,
a domestic merger should be encouraged only if the market is very concentrated and the
demand is not very high. There are cases when the domestic merger is privately proﬁtable,
but not socially desirable (a = 4 and n ∈ {1,..,7}), and also cases when the merger is not
privately proﬁtable, but it is socially beneﬁcial (n = 1 and a ∈ [7,8]).
4.2 Cross-border Mergers with Costless Technology Transfer
In this section, we examine ﬁrm F’s incentives to merge with domestic ﬁrm 1 when it is
costless for the domestic target ﬁrm 1 to adopt the more eﬃcient technology of the foreign
acquirer F. The two ﬁrms contemplating merging are located at opposite ends of the diam-
eter. The merged ﬁrm produces at marginal cost cM = cF. After the merger takes place the
merged ﬁrm gains access to the transportation technology/network of its domestic target, t.











































for i = 0,2,M, where ukCB
i = a +
P
j6=i,F cj − (n + 2)ci, ugCB
i = −t, for i = 0,2,M
`kCB
i = a +
P
j6=i,1 cj − (n + 2)ci + (1/2)t, `gCB
i = −3t, for i = 0,2, and `kCB
M = a +
P
j6=F,1 cj − (n + 2)cF − (1/2)(n + 2)t, `gCB
M = (2n + 3).
27Table 17: Proﬁtability of costless cross-border merger: πCB
M − (π1 + πF)
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 6.4127 5.5298 4.9802 4.6067 4.3370 4.1335 3.9745 3.8470
5 8.6854 7.1690 6.2484 5.6346 5.1981 4.8726 4.6210 4.4209
6 11.2982 9.0172 7.6572 6.7633 6.1348 5.6705 5.3144 5.0331
7 14.2509 11.0742 9.2066 7.9928 7.1472 6.5272 6.0548 5.6836
8 17.5437 13.3400 10.8965 9.3230 8.2351 7.4427 6.8421 6.3724
9 21.1764 15.8148 12.7271 10.7540 9.3987 8.4169 7.6763 7.0996
10 25.1492 18.4985 14.6982 12.2858 10.6378 9.4498 8.5575 7.8651
Table 18: Social Welfare: Costless Cross-border vs pre-merger, SW CB − SW
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 -4.2782 -8.1818 -14.5424 -23.8002 -36.5628 -53.6098 -75.8961 -104.5535
5 -5.7530 -10.4796 -17.7245 -27.9005 -41.6021 -59.6019 -82.8505 -112.4770
6 -7.2504 -12.7895 -20.9139 -32.0056 -46.6448 -65.5964 -89.8066 -120.4019
7 -8.7702 -15.1117 -24.1107 -36.1155 -51.6907 -71.5932 -96.7644 -128.3280
8 -10.3125 -17.4461 -27.3148 -40.2302 -56.7399 -77.5923 -103.7240 -136.2555
9 -11.8773 -19.7927 -30.5264 -44.3496 -61.7924 -83.5938 -110.6853 -144.1843
10 -13.4647 -22.1515 -33.7453 -48.4738 -66.8482 -89.5977 -117.6484 -152.1144
The cross-border merger of ﬁrms 1 and F is proﬁtable if πCB
M > π1+πF, which means the
merged ﬁrm earns higher proﬁts than the two ﬁrms together before merger. Tables 17 shows
that for b = 1, cF = 0, c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.9, c0 = 1, t = 0.3, and ε = 0.7, the cross-border
merger of ﬁrms 1 and F is proﬁtable. The proﬁts of the non-merged ﬁrms also increase
after a merger for the entire range of the demand and competition parameters as shown in
Appendix B.
Although the cross-border merger of ﬁrms 1 and F is privately proﬁtable if technology
transfer is costless, it is not socially beneﬁcial. Table 18 shows that social welfare decreases
after the merger takes place relative to the pre-merger case.
4.3 Cross-border Mergers with Very Costly Technology Transfer
Here we assume that it is prohibitively costly to transfer the more eﬃcient technology of the
foreign acquirer F to the domestic target ﬁrm 1. In this case, the merged ﬁrm must choose
28between operating both plants, 1 and F, thus saving on transportation costs but incurring
higher production costs at plant 1, or shutting down the least eﬃcient plant, 1, but incurring
higher transportation costs. We refer to the former case as no hollowing-out (NH) and to
the latter as hollowing-out (H). We examine each of the two cases in turn.
4.3.1 No Hollowing-Out (NH)
In this case, the merged ﬁrm continues to operate both plant 1 at x = 0 and plant F at
x = 1/2. The merged ﬁrm faces a trade-oﬀ between saving on transportation costs and
higher production costs at plant 1. The merged ﬁrm delivers to consumers on the circle from























The ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between delivering from plant 1 or F if
uπ
NH
M (x) =` π
NH
M (x). (18)








Since cF − c1 < 0 it follows that ˆ x < 1/4. Invoking symmetry we can easily determine
the cutoﬀ location 1 − ˆ x > 3/4 on the (1/2,1) half circle. The merged ﬁrm will deliver to
consumers on (0, ˆ x) and (1− ˆ x,1) from plant 1 and to consumers on (ˆ x,1− ˆ x) from plant F.









































































i , and `gNH
i = `gCB
i , for i = 0,2,M.
294.3.2 Hollowing-Out (H)
In this case, the merged ﬁrm shuts down plant 1 and services the entire circle from the more


























for i = 0,2,M, where kH
i = a +
P
j6=i,F cj − (n + 2)ci, gH
i = −t, for i = 0,2,M and
kH
M = a +
P
j6=F,1 cj − (n + 2)cF − (1/2)(n + 2)t, gH
M = (2n + 3).
A cross-border merger with no hollowing-out occurs if
π
NH





must be satisﬁed. Thus, operating both plants after the merger must yield higher proﬁts
than the two ﬁrms together prior to the merger and must be more proﬁtable than closing
down the least eﬃcient plant. Similarly, a merger with hollowing-out occurs if
π
H





are satisﬁed. Consequently, operating only the most eﬃcient plant after the merger must
yield higher proﬁts than the two ﬁrms combined before merger and must also be more
proﬁtable than operating both plants.
Tables 19 and 20 show that a cross-border merger, with or without hollowing-out, is
never proﬁtable when technology transfer is very costly. At the same time, either type of
merger increases the proﬁts of non-merged ﬁrms, types 0’s and 2’s, as shown in Tables 27–
30. Also, a merger with hollowing-out increases proﬁts of non-merged ﬁrms by more than a
merger with no hollowing-out.
Thus, ﬁrms do not have incentives to engage in cross-border mergers if technology transfer
is very costly. However, as Table 21 shows, a cross-border merger with no hollowing-out is
socially beneﬁcial for the considered range of the demand size parameter if the market is not
very competitive. The cross-border merger with hollowing-out of the domestic ﬁrm reduces
social welfare relative to the pre-merger case and should not be encouraged, as shown in
Table 22.
30Table 19: Proﬁtability of costly cross-border merger with no hollowing-out: πNH
M −(π1+πF)
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 -0.2363 -0.3386 -0.3936 -0.4265 -0.4476 -0.4619 -0.4720 -0.4794
5 -0.3901 -0.5041 -0.5534 -0.5761 -0.5863 -0.5904 -0.5913 -0.5904
6 -0.5789 -0.7006 -0.7393 -0.7474 -0.7432 -0.7343 -0.7236 -0.7127
7 -0.8028 -0.9283 -0.9513 -0.9404 -0.9183 -0.8934 -0.8690 -0.8462
8 -1.0616 -1.1871 -1.1893 -1.1550 -1.1115 -1.0679 -1.0274 -0.9909
9 -1.3554 -1.4769 -1.4535 -1.3914 -1.3228 -1.2577 -1.1990 -1.1469
10 -1.6842 -1.7979 -1.7437 -1.6494 -1.5522 -1.4628 -1.3835 -1.3142
Table 20: Proﬁtability of costly cross-border merger with hollowing-out: πH
M − (π1 + πF)
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 -0.2450 -0.3472 -0.4021 -0.4348 -0.4558 -0.4701 -0.4801 -0.4875
5 -0.4003 -0.5140 -0.5631 -0.5855 -0.5955 -0.5994 -0.6001 -0.5992
6 -0.5907 -0.7118 -0.7501 -0.7578 -0.7533 -0.7441 -0.7332 -0.7221
7 -0.8161 -0.9408 -0.9632 -0.9518 -0.9293 -0.9041 -0.8794 -0.8563
8 -1.0765 -1.2010 -1.2024 -1.1675 -1.1234 -1.0794 -1.0386 -1.0017
9 -1.3718 -1.4922 -1.4677 -1.4048 -1.3356 -1.2700 -1.2108 -1.1584
10 -1.7022 -1.8145 -1.7591 -1.6639 -1.5659 -1.4759 -1.3962 -1.3264
Table 21: Social Welfare: NH vs Pre-merger, SW NH − SW
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 3.0697 2.4572 -0.6704 -6.6676 -16.1236 -29.8195 -48.7200 -73.9712
5 3.9429 3.5938 0.6395 -5.2348 -14.5989 -28.2234 -47.0669 -72.2715
6 4.7936 4.7182 1.9420 -3.8067 -13.0775 -26.6297 -45.4156 -70.5732
7 5.6218 5.8304 3.2372 -2.3834 -11.5593 -25.0384 -43.7660 -68.8761
8 6.4276 6.9303 4.5250 -0.9649 -10.0444 -23.4494 -42.1181 -67.1804
9 7.2108 8.0181 5.8054 0.4488 -8.5328 -21.8627 -40.4720 -65.4860
10 7.9715 9.0936 7.0785 1.8577 -7.0245 -20.2784 -38.8276 -63.7929
31Table 22: Social Welfare: H vs Pre-merger, SW H − SW
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 -0.8804 -1.0840 -1.6733 -3.0424 -5.7760 -10.6410 -18.5847 -30.7342
5 -1.1064 -1.2588 -1.8166 -3.1644 -5.8824 -10.7356 -18.6699 -30.8117
6 -1.3549 -1.4457 -1.9674 -3.2912 -5.9922 -10.8325 -18.7568 -30.8906
7 -1.6259 -1.6449 -2.1254 -3.4228 -6.1052 -10.9318 -18.8455 -30.9708
8 -1.9194 -1.8563 -2.2909 -3.5591 -6.2215 -11.0334 -18.9359 -31.0523
9 -2.2354 -2.0799 -2.4637 -3.7002 -6.3411 -11.1374 -19.0280 -31.1351
10 -2.5739 -2.3157 -2.6439 -3.8462 -6.4639 -11.2437 -19.1219 -31.2192
5 Conclusions
Our paper has examined the proﬁtability and social desirability of mergers, both domestic
and cross-border. Mergers can be proﬁtable in our set-up if reductions in competition and
reductions in production and transport costs outweigh the strategic response of competing
non-merging ﬁrms. Mergers can also be socially beneﬁcial in the presence of strong strate-
gic behaviour of non-merging ﬁrms in combination with cost induced increases in output.
We have also identiﬁed circumstances where mergers are not privately proﬁtable but they
increase social welfare. This may give rise to a role for public policy to encourage mergers
that are socially beneﬁcial.
The results of our model are dependent on its underlying assumptions. Future work
could explore the robustness of the results to changes in these assumptions. For example,
an extension would be to explore diﬀerent production technologies that can give rise to
increasing or decreasing returns to scale. A further extension would be to use a diﬀerent
demand function. In our model, we made two alternative assumptions regarding the cost of
technology transfer. One assumption is that it is costless for the acquirer to transfer its more
eﬃcient technology to the target ﬁrm. The opposite assumption is that technology transfer
is prohibitively costly and the target ﬁrm continues to produce using its high-cost technology
following a merger. It would be interesting to consider the case where technology transfer is
costly, but not prohibitively so. This would allow us to determine the eﬀect of this cost on
merger proﬁtability and the decision of the merged ﬁrm to hollow out the domestic target.
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34Appendices
A Sequential Location Choice
A.1 Pre-Merger Outcome




































Using the expressions in section 2.1 for the location equilibrium identiﬁed above, we can determine ﬁrm
proﬁts as:for s = 0,1/2 and i = 1,2,F where
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A.2 Domestic Merger with Costless Technology Transfer
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t, for i = M,F (A.23)
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A.3 Domestic Merger with Very Costly Technology Transfer and
No Hollowing-Out
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M,NH = tF + (n + 2)t. (A.35)
The indiﬀerence condition
uπNH
M (x) =` πNH
M (x) (A.36)










The merged ﬁrm will thus service consumers located on (0,xD
NH) and (1−xD
NH,1) from plant 1 and consumers
located on (xD
NH,1 − xD
NH) from plant 2.





















































































































37for s = 0,1/2 and i = F,M, where
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A.4 Domestic Merger with Very Costly Technology Transfer and
Hollowing-Out










































38for s = 0,1/2 and i = 1,M, where
k
0,D
0,H = a +
X
j6=0,2






0,H = tF − (n + 2)t, (A.59)
k
1/2,D
0,H = a +
X
j6=0,2






0,H = tF + (n + 4)t, (A.61)
kD
i,H = a +
X
j6=i,2





i,H = t − (n + 2)tF, (A.63)
for i = F,M.
A.5 Type I Cross-Border Merger with Costless Technology Trans-
fer
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39A.6 Type II Cross-Border Merger with Costless Technology Trans-
fer



































































for s = 0,1/2 and i = 1,M, where
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M = (n + 3)t. (A.91)
40A.7 Type II Cross-Border Merger with No Hollowing-Out















The indiﬀerence condition is given by
uπNH


















































































































41for s = 0,1/2 and i = 1,M, where
uk
0,CB
0,NH = a +
X
j6=0,2






0,NH = −(n + 1)t, (A.98)
`k
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0,NH = a +
X
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0,NH = −(n + 3)t, (A.100)
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0,NH = (n + 5)t, (A.102)
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1 = −(n + 3)t, (A.108)
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M,NH = a +
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M = −(n + 1)t, (A.110)
`kCB
M,NH = a +
X
j6=F,2





M,NH = (n + 3)t. (A.112)
A.8 Type II Cross-border Merger with Hollowing Out










































42for s = 0,1/2 and i = 1,M, where
k
0,CB
0,H = a +
X
j6=0,1






0,H = −(n + 1)t, (A.116)
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i,H = −(n + 1)t, (A.120)
43B Proﬁts of Non-Merged Firms
B.1 Simultaneous location choice
44Table 23: Impact of merger on ﬁrm 0 proﬁts: domestic vs pre-merger, πD
0 − π0
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 0.0428 0.0246 0.0157 0.0107 0.0077 0.0058 0.0045 0.0036
5 0.1273 0.0718 0.0448 0.0301 0.0214 0.0158 0.0120 0.0094
6 0.2568 0.1433 0.0887 0.0591 0.0415 0.0304 0.0231 0.0180
7 0.4313 0.2393 0.1473 0.0976 0.0683 0.0498 0.0376 0.0291
8 0.6508 0.3598 0.2207 0.1457 0.1016 0.0739 0.0555 0.0429
9 0.9153 0.5046 0.3088 0.2033 0.1414 0.1026 0.0770 0.0594
10 1.2248 0.6740 0.4116 0.2706 0.1878 0.1360 0.1019 0.0784
Table 24: Impact of merger on ﬁrm F proﬁts: domestic merger vs pre-merger, πD
F − πF
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 0.1705 0.1153 0.0843 0.0652 0.0524 0.0433 0.0367 0.0317
5 0.3375 0.2174 0.1528 0.1140 0.0889 0.0716 0.0593 0.0500
6 0.5495 0.3439 0.2359 0.1724 0.1320 0.1046 0.0853 0.0711
7 0.8065 0.4949 0.3338 0.2404 0.1816 0.1423 0.1148 0.0947
8 1.1085 0.6704 0.4465 0.3180 0.2379 0.1847 0.1477 0.1210
9 1.4555 0.8703 0.5739 0.4051 0.3006 0.2318 0.1842 0.1499
10 1.8475 1.0946 0.7160 0.5018 0.3700 0.2836 0.2241 0.1815
B.2 Sequential location choice
45Table 25: Impact of merger on ﬁrm 0 proﬁts: cross-border merger vs pre-merger, πCB
0 − π0
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 0.7376 0.4693 0.3245 0.2376 0.1814 0.1430 0.1157 0.0954
5 1.7533 1.1124 0.7675 0.5611 0.4279 0.3370 0.2722 0.2245
6 3.1891 2.0200 1.3920 1.0166 0.7746 0.6097 0.4922 0.4057
7 5.0448 3.1920 2.1978 1.6041 1.2217 0.9611 0.7757 0.6392
8 7.3206 4.6284 3.1850 2.3236 1.7690 1.3913 1.1227 0.9249
9 10.0163 6.3293 4.3537 3.1751 2.4167 1.9003 1.5331 1.2628
10 13.1321 8.2946 5.7037 4.1587 3.1647 2.4881 2.0070 1.6529
Table 26: Impact of merger on ﬁrm 2 proﬁts: cross-border merger vs pre-merger, πCB
2 − π2
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 1.0811 0.7486 0.5614 0.4444 0.3657 0.3099 0.2687 0.2371
5 2.2568 1.5184 1.1092 0.8571 0.6899 0.5727 0.4870 0.4222
6 3.8526 2.5526 1.8384 1.4019 1.1145 0.9143 0.7689 0.6595
7 5.8683 3.8513 2.7490 2.0787 1.6393 1.3347 1.1142 0.9490
8 8.3041 5.4144 3.8410 2.8875 2.2644 1.8338 1.5230 1.2908
9 11.1598 7.2420 5.1144 3.8283 2.9899 2.4117 1.9952 1.6848
10 14.4356 9.3340 6.5692 4.9012 3.8156 3.0683 2.5310 2.1310
Table 27: Impact of merger on ﬁrm 0 proﬁts: cross-border merger with no hollowing-out vs
pre-merger, πNH
0 − π0
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 0.1576 0.0981 0.0667 0.0482 0.0364 0.0285 0.0229 0.0188
5 0.3197 0.1949 0.1304 0.0930 0.0695 0.0538 0.0428 0.0349
6 0.5268 0.3161 0.2087 0.1473 0.1090 0.0838 0.0663 0.0537
7 0.7790 0.4618 0.3018 0.2111 0.1552 0.1185 0.0932 0.0751
8 1.0761 0.6319 0.4097 0.2845 0.2079 0.1579 0.1236 0.0991
9 1.4182 0.8265 0.5323 0.3675 0.2671 0.2019 0.1574 0.1258
10 1.8053 1.0455 0.6696 0.4601 0.3329 0.2507 0.1948 0.1552
46Table 28: Impact of merger on ﬁrm 0 proﬁts: cross-border merger with hollowing-out vs
pre-merger, πH
0 − π0
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 0.1587 0.0988 0.0672 0.0486 0.0367 0.0287 0.0230 0.0189
5 0.3213 0.1959 0.1311 0.0935 0.0699 0.0541 0.0431 0.0351
6 0.5289 0.3175 0.2097 0.1479 0.1096 0.0842 0.0666 0.0539
7 0.7816 0.4635 0.3030 0.2120 0.1558 0.1190 0.0936 0.0754
8 1.0792 0.6339 0.4111 0.2856 0.2087 0.1585 0.1241 0.0996
9 1.4218 0.8288 0.5339 0.3687 0.2680 0.2026 0.1580 0.1263
10 1.8094 1.0481 0.6715 0.4615 0.3340 0.2515 0.1954 0.1557
Table 29: Impact of merger on ﬁrm 2 proﬁts: no hollowing-out vs pre-merger, πNH
2 − π2
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 0.2047 0.1343 0.0960 0.0728 0.0575 0.0470 0.0393 0.0335
5 0.3768 0.2377 0.1644 0.1211 0.0933 0.0745 0.0611 0.0512
6 0.5939 0.3656 0.2475 0.1789 0.1357 0.1067 0.0863 0.0715
7 0.8560 0.5180 0.3454 0.2464 0.1846 0.1436 0.1151 0.0944
8 1.1631 0.6947 0.4580 0.3234 0.2401 0.1852 0.1473 0.1200
9 1.5152 0.8960 0.5854 0.4099 0.3021 0.2315 0.1829 0.1482
10 1.9123 1.1216 0.7274 0.5060 0.3707 0.2825 0.2221 0.1790
Table 30: Impact of merger on ﬁrm 2 proﬁts: cross-border merger with hollowing-out vs
pre-merger, πH
2 − π2
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 1.4125 1.3231 1.2654 1.2249 1.1948 1.1717 1.1533 1.1383
5 1.9226 1.7149 1.5840 1.4937 1.4276 1.3771 1.3372 1.3048
6 2.4777 2.1311 1.9173 1.7722 1.6670 1.5872 1.5245 1.4739
7 3.0779 2.5718 2.2654 2.0602 1.9129 1.8020 1.7153 1.6457
8 3.7230 3.0369 2.6283 2.3578 2.1654 2.0215 1.9096 1.8201
9 4.4131 3.5265 3.0059 2.6649 2.4244 2.2456 2.1074 1.9971
10 5.1482 4.0405 3.3982 2.9816 2.6900 2.4745 2.3086 2.1768





Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
10 -0.0251 -0.0296 -0.0352 -0.0423 -0.0510
11 -0.0644 -0.0700 -0.0760 -0.0833 -0.0922
12 -0.1229 -0.1299 -0.1366 -0.1442 -0.1532
13 -0.2006 -0.2095 -0.2169 -0.2250 -0.2342
14 -0.2976 -0.3087 -0.3170 -0.3255 -0.3350
15 -0.4137 -0.4275 -0.4369 -0.4459 -0.4557
16 -0.5490 -0.5658 -0.5765 -0.5861 -0.5963
17 -0.7036 -0.7237 -0.7358 -0.7462 -0.7567
18 -0.8773 -0.9013 -0.9149 -0.9261 -0.9371
19 -1.0702 -1.0984 -1.1138 -1.1258 -1.1373






Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
10 -0.0382 -0.0473 -0.0575 -0.0691 -0.0823
11 -0.0776 -0.0877 -0.0983 -0.1102 -0.1235
12 -0.1362 -0.1477 -0.1589 -0.1711 -0.1846
13 -0.2140 -0.2273 -0.2393 -0.2518 -0.2655
14 -0.3109 -0.3265 -0.3394 -0.3524 -0.3664
15 -0.4271 -0.4453 -0.4592 -0.4728 -0.4871
16 -0.5625 -0.5837 -0.5989 -0.6130 -0.6277
17 -0.7171 -0.7417 -0.7582 -0.7731 -0.7882
18 -0.8909 -0.9192 -0.9373 -0.9530 -0.9685
19 -1.0838 -1.1164 -1.1362 -1.1527 -1.1687
48Table 33: Impact of domestic merger with costless technology transfer on ﬁrm F proﬁts:
πD
F − πF
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
10 -0.2724 -0.4524 -0.6754 -0.9417 -1.2516
11 -0.3494 -0.5512 -0.7954 -1.0828 -1.4136
12 -0.4360 -0.6598 -0.9254 -1.2339 -1.5857
13 -0.5322 -0.7782 -1.0652 -1.3948 -1.7676
14 -0.6380 -0.9064 -1.2149 -1.5657 -1.9595
15 -0.7534 -1.0443 -1.3744 -1.7465 -2.1613
16 -0.8784 -1.1921 -1.5439 -1.9372 -2.3731
17 -1.0130 -1.3497 -1.7232 -2.1378 -2.5948
18 -1.1572 -1.5171 -1.9124 -2.3483 -2.8264
19 -1.3110 -1.6942 -2.1115 -2.5688 -3.0680
Table 34: Impact of domestic merger with costly technology transfer and NH on ﬁrm 0




Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.0251 -0.0296 -0.0352 -0.0423 -0.0510
6 -0.0644 -0.0700 -0.0760 -0.0834 -0.0922
7 -0.1229 -0.1299 -0.1366 -0.1442 -0.1532
8 -0.2006 -0.2095 -0.2169 -0.2250 -0.2342
9 -0.2975 -0.3087 -0.3170 -0.3255 -0.3350
10 -0.4136 -0.4274 -0.4369 -0.4459 -0.4557
11 -0.5490 -0.5658 -0.5765 -0.5861 -0.5963
12 -0.7035 -0.7237 -0.7358 -0.7462 -0.7568
13 -0.8772 -0.9012 -0.9149 -0.9261 -0.9371
14 -1.0701 -1.0984 -1.1138 -1.1258 -1.1373
49Table 35: Impact of domestic merger with costly technology transfer and NH on ﬁrm 0





Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.0380 -0.0472 -0.0574 -0.0691 -0.0823
6 -0.0773 -0.0876 -0.0982 -0.1101 -0.1235
7 -0.1358 -0.1476 -0.1588 -0.1710 -0.1845
8 -0.2136 -0.2271 -0.2391 -0.2517 -0.2655
9 -0.3105 -0.3263 -0.3392 -0.3523 -0.3663
10 -0.4266 -0.4450 -0.4591 -0.4727 -0.4870
11 -0.5619 -0.5834 -0.5987 -0.6129 -0.6276
12 -0.7164 -0.7413 -0.7580 -0.7729 -0.7880
13 -0.8901 -0.9189 -0.9371 -0.9528 -0.9684
14 -1.0831 -1.1160 -1.1360 -1.1526 -1.1686
Table 36: Impact of domestic merger with costly technology transfer on ﬁrm F proﬁts:
πNH
F − πF
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.4175 -0.6762 -0.9927 -1.3678 -1.8019
6 -0.5520 -0.8458 -1.1964 -1.6051 -2.0725
7 -0.7056 -1.0350 -1.4198 -1.8622 -2.3631
8 -0.8785 -1.2438 -1.6629 -2.1391 -2.6735
9 -1.0705 -1.4722 -1.9258 -2.4359 -3.0038
10 -1.2818 -1.7202 -2.2085 -2.7525 -3.3540
11 -1.5123 -1.9877 -2.5109 -3.0889 -3.7240
12 -1.7619 -2.2749 -2.8331 -3.4452 -4.1140
13 -2.0308 -2.5816 -3.1750 -3.8213 -4.5238
14 -2.3188 -2.9079 -3.5366 -4.2172 -4.9535





Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.0250 -0.0296 -0.0352 -0.0423 -0.0510
6 -0.0643 -0.0699 -0.0760 -0.0833 -0.0922
7 -0.1228 -0.1299 -0.1366 -0.1442 -0.1532
8 -0.2004 -0.2094 -0.2169 -0.2249 -0.2342
9 -0.2973 -0.3086 -0.3170 -0.3255 -0.3350
10 -0.4134 -0.4273 -0.4368 -0.4459 -0.4557
11 -0.5487 -0.5656 -0.5764 -0.5861 -0.5962
12 -0.7032 -0.7236 -0.7357 -0.7461 -0.7567
13 -0.8768 -0.9011 -0.9148 -0.9260 -0.9371
14 -1.0697 -1.0982 -1.1136 -1.1257 -1.1373






Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.0379 -0.0471 -0.0574 -0.0690 -0.0823
6 -0.0772 -0.0875 -0.0982 -0.1101 -0.1234
7 -0.1356 -0.1474 -0.1587 -0.1709 -0.1845
8 -0.2133 -0.2270 -0.2391 -0.2517 -0.2654
9 -0.3102 -0.3261 -0.3391 -0.3522 -0.3662
10 -0.4263 -0.4449 -0.4590 -0.4726 -0.4869
11 -0.5616 -0.5832 -0.5985 -0.6128 -0.6275
12 -0.7160 -0.7411 -0.7579 -0.7728 -0.7880
13 -0.8897 -0.9186 -0.9370 -0.9527 -0.9683
14 -1.0826 -1.1157 -1.1358 -1.1524 -1.1685
51Table 39: Impact of domestic merger with costly technology transfer and H on ﬁrm F proﬁts:
πH
F − πF
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.4173 -0.6761 -0.9926 -1.3677 -1.8018
6 -0.5517 -0.8457 -1.1962 -1.6050 -2.0724
7 -0.7053 -1.0348 -1.4196 -1.8621 -2.3630
8 -0.8781 -1.2436 -1.6628 -2.1390 -2.6734
9 -1.0702 -1.4720 -1.9257 -2.4357 -3.0037
10 -1.2814 -1.7199 -2.2083 -2.7523 -3.3539
11 -1.5118 -1.9875 -2.5107 -3.0888 -3.7239
12 -1.7614 -2.2746 -2.8329 -3.4450 -4.1139
13 -2.0302 -2.5813 -3.1748 -3.8211 -4.5237
14 -2.3183 -2.9076 -3.5364 -4.2171 -4.9534
52Table 40: Impact of type I cross-border merger with costless technology transfer and on ﬁrm




Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 0.0292 0.0297 0.0303 0.0309 0.0315
6 0.0437 0.0442 0.0448 0.0454 0.0460
7 0.0582 0.0587 0.0593 0.0599 0.0605
8 0.0727 0.0732 0.0738 0.0744 0.0750
9 0.0872 0.0877 0.0883 0.0889 0.0895
10 0.1017 0.1022 0.1028 0.1034 0.1040
11 0.1162 0.1167 0.1173 0.1179 0.1185
12 0.1307 0.1312 0.1318 0.1324 0.1330
13 0.1452 0.1457 0.1463 0.1469 0.1475
14 0.1597 0.1602 0.1608 0.1614 0.1620
Table 41: Impact of type I cross-border merger with costless technology transfer on ﬁrm 0





Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 0.0198 0.0176 0.0153 0.0131 0.0108
6 0.0343 0.0321 0.0298 0.0276 0.0253
7 0.0488 0.0466 0.0443 0.0421 0.0398
8 0.0633 0.0611 0.0588 0.0566 0.0543
9 0.0778 0.0756 0.0733 0.0711 0.0688
10 0.0923 0.0901 0.0878 0.0856 0.0833
11 0.1068 0.1046 0.1023 0.1001 0.0978
12 0.1213 0.1191 0.1168 0.1146 0.1123
13 0.1358 0.1336 0.1313 0.1291 0.1268
14 0.1503 0.1481 0.1458 0.1436 0.1413
53Table 42: Impact of type I cross-border merger with costless technology transfer on ﬁrm 2
proﬁts: πI
2 − π2
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.0054 -0.0069 -0.0085 -0.0100 -0.0116
6 -0.0049 -0.0064 -0.0080 -0.0095 -0.0111
7 -0.0044 -0.0059 -0.0075 -0.0090 -0.0106
8 -0.0039 -0.0054 -0.0070 -0.0085 -0.0101
9 -0.0034 -0.0049 -0.0065 -0.0080 -0.0096
10 -0.0029 -0.0044 -0.0060 -0.0075 -0.0091
11 -0.0024 -0.0039 -0.0055 -0.0070 -0.0086
12 -0.0019 -0.0034 -0.0050 -0.0065 -0.0081
13 -0.0014 -0.0029 -0.0045 -0.0060 -0.0076
14 -0.0009 -0.0024 -0.0040 -0.0055 -0.0071
Table 43: Impact of type II cross-border merger with costless technology transfer and on




Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.0254 -0.0298 -0.0353 -0.0424 -0.0510
6 -0.0650 -0.0702 -0.0762 -0.0835 -0.0922
7 -0.1237 -0.1303 -0.1368 -0.1444 -0.1533
8 -0.2016 -0.2100 -0.2172 -0.2251 -0.2343
9 -0.2987 -0.3093 -0.3174 -0.3257 -0.3351
10 -0.4150 -0.4281 -0.4373 -0.4462 -0.4559
11 -0.5506 -0.5666 -0.5769 -0.5864 -0.5965
12 -0.7053 -0.7246 -0.7363 -0.7465 -0.7570
13 -0.8792 -0.9022 -0.9155 -0.9265 -0.9374
14 -1.0723 -1.0995 -1.1144 -1.1262 -1.1376
54Table 44: Impact of type II cross-border merger with costless technology transfer and on




Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.0254 -0.0298 -0.0353 -0.0424 -0.0510
6 -0.0650 -0.0702 -0.0762 -0.0835 -0.0922
7 -0.1237 -0.1303 -0.1368 -0.1444 -0.1533
8 -0.2016 -0.2100 -0.2172 -0.2251 -0.2343
9 -0.2987 -0.3093 -0.3174 -0.3257 -0.3351
10 -0.4150 -0.4281 -0.4373 -0.4462 -0.4559
11 -0.5506 -0.5666 -0.5769 -0.5864 -0.5965
12 -0.7053 -0.7246 -0.7363 -0.7465 -0.7570
13 -0.8792 -0.9022 -0.9155 -0.9265 -0.9374
14 -1.0723 -1.0995 -1.1144 -1.1262 -1.1376
Table 45: Impact of type II cross-border merger with costless technology transfer on ﬁrm 0





Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.0386 -0.0475 -0.0576 -0.0692 -0.0824
6 -0.0781 -0.0880 -0.0985 -0.1103 -0.1236
7 -0.1368 -0.1481 -0.1591 -0.1712 -0.1847
8 -0.2148 -0.2278 -0.2395 -0.2520 -0.2657
9 -0.3119 -0.3270 -0.3397 -0.3526 -0.3665
10 -0.4282 -0.4459 -0.4596 -0.4730 -0.4873
11 -0.5637 -0.5843 -0.5992 -0.6133 -0.6279
12 -0.7184 -0.7424 -0.7587 -0.7734 -0.7884
13 -0.8924 -0.9200 -0.9378 -0.9533 -0.9687
14 -1.0855 -1.1172 -1.1367 -1.1531 -1.1690
55Table 46: Impact of type II cross-border merger with costless technology transfer on ﬁrm 1
proﬁts: πII
1 − π1
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.0237 -0.0346 -0.0458 -0.0580 -0.0717
6 -0.0596 -0.0725 -0.0846 -0.0975 -0.1115
7 -0.1148 -0.1300 -0.1433 -0.1568 -0.1712
8 -0.1891 -0.2071 -0.2217 -0.2359 -0.2508
9 -0.2826 -0.3038 -0.3198 -0.3349 -0.3503
10 -0.3953 -0.4201 -0.4377 -0.4537 -0.4696
11 -0.5272 -0.5560 -0.5754 -0.5923 -0.6089
12 -0.6784 -0.7114 -0.7328 -0.7507 -0.7680
13 -0.8487 -0.8865 -0.9099 -0.9290 -0.9470
14 -1.0382 -1.0811 -1.1069 -1.1272 -1.1458
Table 47: Impact of cross-border merger with costly technology transfer and NH and on ﬁrm




Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.0254 -0.0297 -0.0353 -0.0424 -0.0510
6 -0.0649 -0.0702 -0.0762 -0.0834 -0.0922
7 -0.1235 -0.1303 -0.1368 -0.1444 -0.1533
8 -0.2014 -0.2099 -0.2172 -0.2251 -0.2343
9 -0.2985 -0.3092 -0.3173 -0.3257 -0.3351
10 -0.4148 -0.4280 -0.4372 -0.4461 -0.4558
11 -0.5503 -0.5664 -0.5768 -0.5864 -0.5965
12 -0.7050 -0.7245 -0.7362 -0.7465 -0.7569
13 -0.8788 -0.9021 -0.9154 -0.9264 -0.9373
14 -1.0719 -1.0993 -1.1143 -1.1262 -1.1376
56Table 48: Impact of cross-border merger with costly technology transfer and NH on ﬁrm 0





Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 -0.0385 -0.0475 -0.0576 -0.0692 -0.0824
6 -0.0780 -0.0879 -0.0985 -0.1103 -0.1236
7 -0.1367 -0.1480 -0.1591 -0.1712 -0.1847
8 -0.2146 -0.2277 -0.2395 -0.2519 -0.2656
9 -0.3116 -0.3269 -0.3396 -0.3525 -0.3665
10 -0.4279 -0.4457 -0.4595 -0.4730 -0.4872
11 -0.5634 -0.5842 -0.5991 -0.6132 -0.6278
12 -0.7181 -0.7422 -0.7585 -0.7733 -0.7883
13 -0.8920 -0.9198 -0.9377 -0.9532 -0.9687
14 -1.0851 -1.1170 -1.1366 -1.1530 -1.1689
Table 49: Impact of cross-border merger with costly technology transfer and NH on ﬁrm 1
proﬁts: πNH
1,CB − π1
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 0.0209 0.1041 0.2406 0.4322 0.6796
6 -0.0107 0.0732 0.2104 0.4025 0.6504
7 -0.0614 0.0228 0.1605 0.3530 0.6012
8 -0.1313 -0.0472 0.0908 0.2837 0.5322
9 -0.2205 -0.1369 0.0014 0.1946 0.4433
10 -0.3288 -0.2461 -0.1078 0.0855 0.3346
11 -0.4563 -0.3749 -0.2368 -0.0433 0.2059
12 -0.6031 -0.5233 -0.3855 -0.1920 0.0574
13 -0.7690 -0.6913 -0.5540 -0.3605 -0.1111
14 -0.9541 -0.8789 -0.7422 -0.5488 -0.2994





Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 0.0179 0.0168 0.0157 0.0146 0.0135
6 0.0284 0.0273 0.0262 0.0251 0.0240
7 0.0389 0.0378 0.0367 0.0356 0.0345
8 0.0494 0.0483 0.0472 0.0461 0.0450
9 0.0599 0.0588 0.0577 0.0566 0.0555
10 0.0704 0.0693 0.0682 0.0671 0.0660
11 0.0809 0.0798 0.0787 0.0776 0.0765
12 0.0914 0.0903 0.0892 0.0881 0.0870
13 0.1019 0.1008 0.0997 0.0986 0.0975
14 0.1124 0.1113 0.1102 0.1091 0.1080
Table 51: Impact of cross-border merger with costly technology transfer and H on ﬁrm 0





Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 0.0169 0.0163 0.0157 0.0151 0.0145
6 0.0274 0.0268 0.0262 0.0256 0.0250
7 0.0379 0.0373 0.0367 0.0361 0.0355
8 0.0484 0.0478 0.0472 0.0466 0.0460
9 0.0589 0.0583 0.0577 0.0571 0.0565
10 0.0694 0.0688 0.0682 0.0676 0.0670
11 0.0799 0.0793 0.0787 0.0781 0.0775
12 0.0904 0.0898 0.0892 0.0886 0.0880
13 0.1009 0.1003 0.0997 0.0991 0.0985
14 0.1114 0.1108 0.1102 0.1096 0.1090
58Table 52: Impact of cross-border merger with costly technology transfer and H on ﬁrm F
proﬁts: πH
F,CB − πF
Demand Number of ﬁrms (n)
size (a) 2 4 6 8 10
5 0.3959 0.6603 0.9895 1.3835 1.8423
6 0.4964 0.7968 1.1620 1.5920 2.0868
7 0.5969 0.9333 1.3345 1.8005 2.3313
8 0.6974 1.0698 1.5070 2.0090 2.5758
9 0.7979 1.2063 1.6795 2.2175 2.8203
10 0.8984 1.3428 1.8520 2.4260 3.0648
11 0.9989 1.4793 2.0245 2.6345 3.3093
12 1.0994 1.6158 2.1970 2.8430 3.5538
13 1.1999 1.7523 2.3695 3.0515 3.7983
14 1.3004 1.8888 2.5420 3.2600 4.0428
59